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abstract
In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justied
belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead under-
stand justication in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justi-
cation as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is
justied just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circum-
stances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and
Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according
to which justication is a matter of sufciently high evidential likelihood. In par-
ticular, I suggest that this conception of justication offers a plausible account
of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition – for example
that one’s lottery ticket will lose – on the basis of probabilistic evidence.
Most epistemologists nowadays are willing to concede that the project of offering a reduc-
tive analysis of knowledge has not been a success, and for reasons of principle rather than
lack of imagination, ingenuity or application on the part of those who engaged in that pro-
ject. The prevailing scepticism about this project seems to me to be to some degree mer-
ited, though I also think that much recent epistemology has recoiled much too far in
the opposite direction. Proponents of knowledge rst epistemology typically agree with
knowledge’s would-be analysers that belief and justication are necessary for knowledge,
but they have proposed radically rethinking how they relate to knowledge. Belief and jus-
tication are to be illuminated in terms of our grasp of knowledge, not vice versa – which
is not, of course, to suggest that reductive analyses of belief and justication in terms of
knowledge are possible.
On the traditional picture, presupposed by the project of analysing knowledge, knowl-
edge is built out of more fundamental elements. An item of knowledge is to be understood
as a true belief that has sufciently impressive epistemic credentials, where this involves
justication and the right kind of connection between the fact that P and the subject’s
belief that P. Given this conception of knowledge, most of the action involves spelling
out what it takes for a belief to be sufciently justied, what it takes for it to be hooked
up to the relevant facts in the right way, and determining the extent to which buying into
these conditions involves compromises of internalism – whatever these amount to.
Knowledge rst epistemology promises an end to politics as usual. The recurring frustra-
tions encountered by attempts to analyse knowledge in terms of belief and justication are
diagnosed as symptoms of having adopted a fundamentally misguided project, one which
we need not pursue any further. And knowledge rst accounts of justication tend to be
unabashedly externalist in character, in the sense that one lacks any kind of special access
to the factors in virtue of which propositions or beliefs are justied or unjustied, or to
whether a given proposition or belief is justied or not. On such accounts, the externalist
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character of justication trickles down from the externalist character of knowledge, leav-
ing no room for internalism.
In earlier work (McGlynn 2011), I have argued against this approach to theorising
about belief. Belief should not be thought of as a state essentially aimed at knowledge
or governed by a knowledge norm, nor is to believe something to treat it as something
one knows, or to be committed on pain of irrationality to so treating it.1 I won’t
rehearse that discussion here (though I will consider the claim that belief aims at
knowledge again below). Rather, I want to turn to knowledge rst approaches to
justication.
Such accounts provide too broad and varied a target to be treated in single paper. There
are no fewer than three distinct proposals to be considered. First we have Timothy
Williamson’s (2000) inuential suggestion that one’s total evidence just is one’s knowl-
edge, with a proposition being justied to the degree that it’s likely in light of one’s evi-
dence. Second, Jonathan Sutton (2007) has proposed that in the sense of primary
interest to epistemologists, P is justied for S just in case S knows that P. And lastly,
Alexander Bird (2007) and Martin Smith (2010) have proposed that justication is a
kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge, in a sense to be explained shortly.2 Williamson’s equation
of one’s evidence with what one knows demands extended discussion, and I won’t attempt
such discussion here.3 Sutton’s proposal is utterly implausible on the face of it, and the
arguments in its favour have been well critiqued elsewhere (see Coffman 2010; Kelp
2011). Here my focus will be on Bird and Smith’s accounts. My primary aim will be to
show that these accounts are not well motivated, and that they are problematic. A second-
ary aim will be to defend a more traditional conception of justication, according to which
one has justication for a proposition just when it is made sufciently likely by the evi-
dence one has. Following Smith, I’ll call this the risk-minimisation conception. My discus-
sion will fall short of putting us in a position to respond to Smith’s objections to this
conception once and for all – its defenders still have much work ahead of them. But I
do want to argue that this conception of justication looks rather more promising than
the alternatives offered by Bird and Smith.
This paper divides into four sections. §1 introduces Bird’s account of justication, and
argues that Bird fails to motivate the key thought underlying it. §2 considers Bird’s claim
that his account explains one of the key intuitions that motivates internalism, and nds it
problematic. §3 looks at the motivations for Smith’s account, which turn on contrasting it
with the risk-minimisation account that I favour. I argue that Smith’s objections to the
risk-minimisation account are at best inconclusive. Finally, in §4 I offer two objections
to Smith’s own account: one to the claim that he has offered a plausible sufcient con-
dition for having justication, and the second to the more important claim that he has
offered a plausible necessary condition for having justication.
1 See also Whiting forthcoming, which independently makes a number of related points against these
theses.
2 The phrase originally comes from Sutton (2007: 10), but it is co-opted by Bird (2007: 83). I should note
that while there’s a sense in which Smith puts forward a knowledge rst account of justication, it is
unclear to what extent he would endorse the main tenets of knowledge rst philosophy as I have charac-
terised them here. I will discuss this point more fully when I introduce his account below.
3 I will address Williamson’s position in detail in McGlynn in progress.
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1. juju
Bird’s core idea is that a belief or judgement is justied when it fails to be knowledge only
because of non-mental confounding factors, of the sort present in standard Gettier cases.4
Bird formulates this view as follows (2007: 84):
(JuJu) If in world w1 S has mental states M and then forms a judgment, that judgment is
justied if and only if there is some world w2 where, with the same mental states M, S
forms a corresponding judgment and that judgment yields knowledge.5
We can get a feel for this account by considering three test cases. The rst is a standard
Gettier case (though I adapt this particular example from Russell 1948, rather than
from Gettier 1963). Ashley looks at her hitherto impeccably reliable watch, and sees
that it reads two o’clock. She forms the belief that it is two o’clock on this basis. As it hap-
pens, Ashley’s watch stopped exactly twelve hours prior, and she just happened to look at
it during a minute when trusting it would give her a true belief. The second test case we
can consider is a variant, in which Bryan correctly guesses that it is two o’clock. Lastly, we
can consider a lottery case, in which Clare believes a ‘lottery proposition’ (Vogel 1990);
she has a true belief that her lottery ticket – one of one million in a draw with a single
guaranteed winner – will lose, basing this belief on the probabilistic grounds available
to her before the outcome of the draw has been announced.
As Bird interprets (JuJu), it entails that Ashley is justied but Bryan is not. Ashley’s belief
is justied because she forms it in such a way that it would have been knowledge had her
environment been suitably cooperative (2007: 85). Bryan’s guess isn’t like this at all; since
Bryan has no good evidence that it’s two o’clock, there’s no world in which someone
with the same mental states as Bryan reaches knowledge. Much more controversially,
(JuJu) entails that Clare is no better off than Bryan.6 According to Bird, Clare’s belief
also fails to be knowledge for reasons internal to her mental life, and so for which she, rather
than an uncooperative world, is responsible. That’s because Clare’s belief is based on what
Bird (following Nelkin 2000) calls a P-inference: an inference of the form ‘P has a statistical
probability of n (where n is very close to 1) therefore P’ (2007: 102).
4 I won’t worry about the distinction between belief and judgment here. Bird does distinguish these (2007:
96–7), but the distinction doesn’t play a signicant role in his discussion, and generally he seems pretty
happy with moving back and forth between them fairly freely.
5 Notice that there’s no requirement that w1 and w2 be distinct, and so justication remains a necessary
condition for knowledge on Bird’s account. Notice too that (JuJu) does not require that there is a world
in which one’s judgement yields knowledge, but only that some ‘corresponding’ judgement does. This
enables Bird to leave room for justied judgements and beliefs in necessary falsehoods. It is the counter-
part of a standard move made by defenders of a safety condition on knowledge in order to leave room
for unsafe beliefs in modally robust propositions, such as necessary truths. Several people have
suggested to me that this complication in Bird’s account will lead to trouble when it comes to knowledge
of one’s own mental states. I haven’t been able to construct a convincing objection of this sort, which is
why I do not pursue the point in the text.
6 I’m assuming here that Clare cannot know that her ticket has lost. Not everyone accepts that lottery
propositions cannot be known, and Bird notes that (JuJu) is compatible with one both knowing and
being justied in believing that one’s ticket has lost. However, he seems strongly inclined to think
that one can’t have such knowledge, and both Smith and myself agree, so I’ll take this as a piece of com-
mon ground throughout.
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(JuJu) is primarily supported by the idea that knowledge is the aim of belief. Bird is
quite explicit about this (2007: 93):
Justication is a kind of near miss. Knowledge is the epistemic bull’s-eye. Justication occurs
when an unexpected gust of wind nudges the arrow off-centre. Unjustied belief occurs when
one’s aim was poor or one fumbled the release. The key element of this view is that belief aims
or ought to aim at knowledge; knowledge is thus the primary norm for belief.
Consequently, Bird’s principal motivation for (JuJu) consists of an argument for the claim
that knowledge is the aim of belief. The argument comes in the following passage, which I
quote in full (2007: 93–4; italics in original):
The question amounts to this, is the truth of a belief enough for it to have achieved its constitutive
aim, for it to have fullled its function fully? Or is mere truth not alone sufcient for the function to
be fullled? Certainly falsity is a good reason to give up a belief – its presence marks a lack of
achievement on the part of the believer. So truth is part of the aim of belief. But, I claim, it is not
enough. If truth were sufcient for the fullment of its constitutive aim then one could have no com-
plaint with someone whose beliefs are true. But clearly this is not right. A belief that is merely acci-
dentally true and lacks justication may rightly be criticised on this score (even a self-deceiver may be
accidentally right). So, I suggest, justication is required as well. Are justication and truth jointly
sufcient for the success of belief? It would be odd if the norm of belief were the conjunction of
two independent factors. As Gettier-style examples show, there is nothing special about a belief
that is both justied and true. The best explanation of all this data is, I propose, that knowledge
is the aim of belief.
This argument is questionable on a number of fronts, even if one concedes that belief aims
at truth.7 The main defect of the argument is its reliance on the deeply implausible
assumption that, if truth were sufcient to full the constitutive aim of belief, one could
have no complaint with any true believer. Complaints can be levelled at failures to full
aims that are not constitutive of the act being performed – or so one naturally supposes
in the absence of any argument to the contrary.8 For example, Williamson (2000: 238)
points out that assertions can be criticised as rude, but no one would suggest that avoiding
rudeness is a constitutive aim of assertion.9
In a footnote (2007: 93, n. 8) Bird suggests that his account ‘does not strictly depend’
on his argument for the claim that knowledge is the aim of belief, since (JuJu) might still be
7 See McGlynn 2011: §6 and Whiting forthcoming: §5.
8 Whiting (forthcoming) offers a similar criticism, noting that defenders of a truth norm of belief typically
take it to generate secondary norms, including a justication norm. Allan Hazlett has pointed out a clo-
sely related way to cast doubt on Bird’s assumption. The defender of a truth norm of belief might natu-
rally distinguish evaluations of beliefs from evaluations of believers, just as defenders of a truth norm of
assertion will distinguish between evaluations of assertions and evaluations of asserters (Weiner 2007:
193). Then the fact that it can be appropriate to criticise a true believer won’t show that is something
defective about the belief, contrary to Bird’s claim.
9 Declan Smithies (2012) also argues that belief aims at knowledge. His rst argument turns on
Williamson’s ‘observation’ (2012: 284) that a belief that P is defective if one is not in a position to
know that P. This is hardly a datum. His second rests on his independently implausible claim that
one has justication to believe P if and only if one has justication to believe that one is in a position
to know that P. See Smith 2012b for, to my mind, convincing criticism of this claim.
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motivated on the grounds that it is ‘a component of a package that overall provides a more
satisfactory explanation of various phenomena than its competitors’. This is a little puz-
zling; as Bird notes in the passage to which this footnote is attached (quoted above),
that belief aims at knowledge is ‘the key element’ of his account, and if its key element
is left unmotivated, surely that is some reason not to accept it.
But let us set that concern aside. Bird’s claim that his account gains motivation from its
explanatory power rests primarily on two points. First, Bird suggests that it offers an
improvement on Dana Nelkin’s (2000) unied response to the knowledge and justication
versions of the lottery paradox (2007: 100–3). Second, he argues that it explains the truth of
an intuition typically taken to support internalist conceptions of justication over externalist
ones (2007: 97–100). Bird’s treatment of the lottery paradox rests largely on his contention
that belief aims at knowledge (2007: 101), and I will discuss lotteries at some length below
when considering Smith’s account, so I won’t consider this further here. In the next section I
will evaluate Bird’s claim to be able to explain a key internalist intuition.
2. mentalism
Let mentalism be the thesis that justication supervenes on mental states alone. Mentalism
is usually associated with internalism; indeed, mentalism is sometimes taken to be the core
claim of internalism (e.g. Conee and Feldman 2001). Bird presents the truth of mentalism
as a ‘central internalist intuition’ (2007: 83), but notes that it is entailed by (JuJu). And so
Bird claims that an advantage of his (externalist) account is that it can explain the truth of
this supposedly internalist intuition.
However, I think it is a mistake to describe the truth of mentalism as an internalist
intuition. Rather, it is a thesis that some internalists have tried to motivate on the grounds
that it best explains the intuitions we have about certain cases. First of all, we can con-
struct a series of cases in which one subject is justied while another is not (or the rst
subject is better justied than the second), while the only relevant differences between
them seem to be in their mental states (Conee and Feldman 2001). Second, there is a
powerful intuition that the victim of a Cartesian demon can be just as justied as we
are, and one explanation of this is that such victims might be mental duplicates of ordin-
ary epistemically successful subjects like ourselves.10
Bird follows Williamson in taking knowledge to be a mental state (2007: 82), and so he
argues that factive mental states should be allowed into the supervenience base of justi-
cation on the grounds that otherwise the internalist ‘intuition’ will be question-begging
(2007: 97), and since ‘when it is qualied by reference to the semi-technical idea of a non-
factive mental state, it begins to look less like a ubiquitous intuition and more like a sub-
stantive thesis in need of a defence’ (2007: 98). But mentalism is a substantive thesis in
need of defence. Moreover, this remains as true when the thesis is in Bird’s hands as it
is when it is in the hands of the internalist. And it is not obvious that Bird’s externalist
version of mentalism inherits either of the standard internalist motivations. Perhaps an
argument parallel to that offered by Conee and Feldman can be constructed. This
10 An example is provided in the passage from Ralph Wedgewood that Bird quotes (2007: 97–8), though
tellingly Bird ignores this aspect of it. I should note that I’m not endorsing these internalist arguments
for mentalism – I’m only noting that internalists have supplied such arguments.
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would involve assembling sufciently many examples in which it is plausible that a differ-
ence in justicatory status is turning on differences in the mental states of the subjects,
including their factive mental states.11 Bird offers no such argument. As for victims of
the ‘new evil demon’, accepting Williamson’s thesis that there are factive mental states
has the consequence that no such victim can be the mental duplicate of any ordinary epis-
temically successful subject, since such subjects will have knowledge that the demon victim
lacks. This consequence may have its advantages, particularly when it comes to combating
scepticism (see Williamson 2000: ch. 8). But it is easy to see that it renders the comparison
between such victims and ordinary successful subjects useless for motivating mentalism.
Bird’s account of justication entails mentalism, but only in a form that tears it completely
free from its moorings. In the end, it is simply another unmotivated aspect of his account.
3. risk-minimisation and normic support
Smith offers an alternative way of making more precise the thought underlying Bird’s
account, namely that my belief is justied just I case I have done everything I can to ensure
that it is knowledge, any failure being down to the world failing to hold up its end of the
bargain (Smith 2010: 12, 17). This is the sense in which Smith too holds that justication
is ‘would-be’ knowledge. He also says that Bird’s (JuJu) ‘comes close to being right’ (2010:
27–8, n. 2). But we should note some differences, even before we get into the details of
Smith’s account. First, while Bird’s account is an account of doxastic justication (what
it takes for a belief or judgement to be justied), Smith is more concerned with prop-
ositional justication (what it takes for one to have justication for some proposition,
which one may or may not avail oneself of).
Another difference is that, while Bird explicitly identies his account as a contribution to
knowledge rst philosophy, Smith does not. Indeed, he expresses some misgivings about the-
ses that, while not quite constitutive of knowledge rst philosophy as I characterised it in the
introduction, tend to be held by its proponents (for instance, that one’s total evidence is one’s
total knowledge, and that knowledge is the norm of assertion). Nonetheless, Smith’s account
is naturally taken as one in which knowledge has an important kind of priority over justi-
cation: like Bird, Smith sees justication as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. On issues about
justication, Smith’s aims and views align very closely with proponents of knowledge rst
philosophy, even if they diverge signicantly elsewhere.
Smith develops and motivates his account by contrasting it with a more traditional con-
ception of justication, which he calls the risk-minimisation conception. According to this
conception, one’s having justication for P is a matter of P being sufciently likely given
one’s evidence, and the more likely P is given one’s evidence, the more justication one has
for P. The evidential likelihood of a proposition P is neither the degree to which one actu-
ally believes it, given that evidence, nor the objective likelihood that it is true. Williamson
(2000: 209–11) argues persuasively that the evidential likelihood of P cannot be identied
as the credence a perfectly rational agent in possession of our current evidence would have
11 The thought here is that if the italicised condition is not met, then the cases cannot provide any motiv-
ation to broaden the supervenience base to include factive mental states.
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in P, though Smith suggests (2010: 12) that this comes close to the intended notion, and so
perhaps this identication will sufce to x ideas enough for the discussion to follow.
So the risk-minimisation conception sees justication as a matter of high evidential like-
lihood, and having more or less justication to believe a proposition as a matter of that
proposition’s being more or less evidentially likely.12 These are the claims that Smith
attempts to cast doubt on, and he does so using the following case (2010: 13–41, adapted
from Nelkin 2000):
Suppose that I have set up my computer such that, whenever I turn it on, the colour of the back-
ground is determined by a random number generator. For one value out of one million possible
values the background will be red. For the remaining 999 999 values, the background will be
blue. One day I turn on my computer and then go into the next room to attend to something else.
In the meantime Bruce, who knows nothing about how my computer’s background colour is deter-
mined, wanders into the computer room and sees that the computer is displaying a blue background.
He comes to believe that it is. Let’s suppose, for the time being, that my relevant evidence consists of
the proposition that (E1) it is 99.9999% likely that my computer is displaying a blue background,
while Bruce’s relevant evidence consists of the proposition that (E2) the computer visually appears to
him to be displaying a blue background.
The conclusion we are invited to draw is that Bruce has justication to believe that the
computer background is blue, while Martin does not.13 But, so Smith argues, the likeli-
hood that the computer screen is displaying a blue background is lower given Bruce’s evi-
dence (E2) than given Martin’s evidence (E1). However unlikely it is that Bruce is
hallucinating, being subject to a sudden bout of colour-blindness, being taken in by a cun-
ning illusion which makes it appear that the background is blue when it is in fact red, and
so on, ‘the likelihood, given Bruce’s evidence E2, that the computer is displaying a blue
background would be no where near as high as 99.9999%’ (Smith 2010: 14). And so
the worry is that the risk minimisation conception of justication gets this case completely
wrong, since it entails that Martin has more justication than Bruce, when in fact Bruce
has justication and Martin does not.
Smith’s alternative proposal is that to have justication to believe a proposition P it is
necessary that one’s body of evidence E normically support P, where for E to normically
support P is for the most normal worlds in which E is true to be worlds in which P is true
(2010: 17). Consider how this works in the above case. The idea is that there is nothing
abnormal about a world in which Martin’s evidence (E1) is true, but in which the screen
background is red. It is statistically highly unlikely, but it requires no special explanation.
In contrast, the most normal worlds in which Bruce’s evidence (E2) is true are all ones in
which the computer screen displays a blue background; the worlds in which the computer
visually appears to him to be displaying a blue background when it is not involve abnorm-
alities like hallucination, random bouts of colour-blindness and the like.
12 This is obviously just a sketch of the risk-minimisation conception. The basic idea can be elaborated in
a number of different ways, and I intend to stay neutral on these further issues about what shape it
should take here. The core idea should be clear and familiar enough for the discussion to follow.
13 As is clear from the quote, Smith features in his own example. For clarity I will use ‘Smith’ to refer to
the philosopher, and ‘Martin’ to refer to the subject in the example. This follows a precedent set by
discussions of Keith DeRose’s ‘bank-cases’ in the literature on epistemic contextualism.
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In the remainder of this section I will consider whether this example really does favour
Smith’s normic support account over any version of the risk-minimisation conception,
concluding that it does not. In the following section I will develop two objections to
Smith’s account.
Clearly an important aspect of Smith’s attempt to motivate an alternative to the risk-
minimisation conception is his claim that Martin lacks justication in the example he
describes. The truth of this claim is hardly obvious; indeed, as Smith notes, a number
of philosophers have found it natural to assume that such examples are cases of justica-
tion (see, for instance, Lewis 1996: 551; Hawthorne 2004: 9; Pritchard 2008: 440; and
perhaps even Williamson 2000).14 Against this assumption Smith (2010: 14) offers four
considerations. First, that it is ‘natural’ to describe Martin’s belief, should he form one
on the evidence available to him, as a presumption, but this is not a natural description
of Bruce’s belief. Second, that Bruce’s belief is a very promising candidate for knowledge,
and in fact will be knowledge if the case is lled out in the most natural way, while in con-
trast Martin’s belief isn’t a good candidate for knowledge at all. Third, that Bruce can out-
right assert that the screen is blue, while Martin should say something more qualied, like
‘It’s overwhelmingly likely that the background is blue’. And nally, that presumably
Martin should only believe the qualied thing too. Smith concludes that ‘the implication
of these considerations is clear enough: Bruce has justication for believing that the com-
puter is displaying a blue background while [Martin] does not’ (2010: 14).
I don’t think this supposed implication is clear at all. Consider the rst point. We natu-
rally call something a presumption when one’s evidence for it is manifestly circumstantial:
that is, when it clearly involves ampliative inference from one’s evidence. Calling one’s
belief a presumption carries no implication that one lacks justication. Knowing that
Dave is a naturally reclusive character, and that he hasn’t come to any of the last thirty
dinner parties I have invited him to, I believe that he will not come to my next dinner
party. It is natural to describe this as a presumption, so long as Dave hasn’t actually expli-
citly turned down this particular invitation. I can say to my partner, ‘I’m presuming that
Dave isn’t coming this time either, so I won’t bother setting a place for him’, though again,
only so long as Dave hasn’t explicitly told me he is not coming to this particular party.
Still, there’s no temptation on that score to say that my belief is unjustied. Sometimes cir-
cumstantial evidence can be good enough for justication or even knowledge. All that we
can conclude from Smith’s rst point is that it is natural to think Martin’s evidence for
believing that the computer background is blue is obviously circumstantial, but that
Bruce’s is not. But that’s pretty uncontroversial; Martin’s belief that the computer back-
ground is blue is the conclusion of an inference from the probabilities involved, while
Bruce is just looking directly at the blue screen.
14 One then needs to qualify the principle of multi-premise closure for justication if one is to avoid the
lottery paradox, but as Smith notes, the risk-minimisation conception commits one to qualifying that
principle anyway, due to familiar considerations about risk-aggregation. A more worrying possibility
is that the risk-minimisation conception also commits one to qualifying even single premise closure for
justication, since it has been argued that we nd a form of risk-aggregation even with supposedly
single-premise inferences (DeRose 1999: 23, n. 14, Lasonen-Aarnio 2008). This is not the place to
engage with this challenge (though see Smith 2012a). I will argue below that Smith’s conception of
justication is no better placed to preserve standard closure principles for justication, and so the
issue, while important, will turn out to be orthogonal to the present debate.
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Smith’s second point rests on his assumption that justication is what makes a belief a
good candidate for knowledge (2010: 12). This can be read in at least two importantly
different ways. Interpreted as a kind of generic claim or as a functional characterisation
of justication, it seems hard to contest. However, so read, it provides no support for
Smith’s conclusion. Justication being the kind of thing that makes a belief a good candi-
date for knowledge doesn’t entail that if a belief isn’t a good candidate for knowledge,
then it isn’t justied. Smith needs the stronger interpretation, according to which any belief
that is not a good candidate for knowledge isn’t justied. But the stronger interpretation
lacks the intuitive appeal of the weaker claim, and Smith provides no argument for it.15
Let’s turn to Smith’s third observation, that while Bruce can outright assert that the
screen is blue, Martin can only assert something more qualied. Now, defenders of the
knowledge account of assertion, according to which one ought to assert P only if one
knows P, will wonder why his observation isn’t adequately explained by observing that
Bruce knows that the screen is blue, while Martin doesn’t. Since I’m not inclined to accept
the knowledge account, and Smith doesn’t seem to be either, I’ll leave this response aside here.
Even without the knowledge account of assertion, the inference from the claim that
Martin cannot outright assert that the screen is blue to the conclusion that he lacks justi-
cation looks suspect. I believe Dave won’t come to my next dinner party on the grounds
that he hasn’t come the previous thirty times I have invited him to such a gathering, rather
than because he’s responded to this particular invitation. It is plausible that I should not
at-out assert that he’s not coming; rather I should say ‘Dave’s probably not coming’, or
‘Presumably Dave’s not coming’, or something like that. But again, the case should strike
most non-sceptics as a routine instance of an inductively justied belief. So there’s no
general implication from fact that one should make assertions that are qualied in this
manner to the conclusion that one lacks justication to believe the unqualied claim.16
The bearing of Smith’s fourth consideration, that Martin should only believe the qua-
lied claim until he has investigated further, is more immediate. But in fact, it is too
immediate. Smith (2010: 14) assumes a ‘minimal conception’ of justication, which is sup-
posed to be common ground between proponents and opponents of the risk-minimisation
conception:
What I mean when I say that one has justication for believing P is simply that it would be epis-
temically or intellectually appropriate for one to believe or accept that P is true, given the evidence
at one’s disposal.
This thin characterisation of justication does seem unobjectionable. However, once we
adopt it, Smith’s presumption that Martin ought not believe the unqualied claim that
the screen is blue given the evidence available to him looks tantamount to a presumption
15 See McGlynn 2011 for criticism of a number of arguments that one might appeal to in support of the
stronger reading of the claim.
16 Of course, to say this much is not to explain why Martin cannot outright assert that the computer
screen is blue. One strategy is to appeal to the idea that there’s some kind of pragmatic impropriety
here (Weiner 2005; Lackey 2007; thanks to Allan Hazlett for suggesting this). I’m sceptical that this
kind of explanation can be made to work (compare McGlynn 2011: §8), and so I need to offer an
alternative. I leave that as a task for another occasion (McGlynn in progress).
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that he does not have justication for that claim. But that’s just the conclusion that Smith
is working for.
I conclude that none of Smith’s four considerations should persuade us that in the case
described Martin lacks justication to believe the unqualied claim that the computer
screen background is blue.17 And to the extent that we nd it plausible that Martin
does have justication in the example, we have reason to favour the risk-minimisation
conception over Smith’s alternative.
There is, however, a residual reason to think that this example favours Smith’s account.
Even if it is not clear that the risk-minimisation conception gets the wrong verdict on
whether Martin has justication, one might still contend that it mistakenly implies that
Martin has more justication than Bruce. Smith’s account doesn’t face this worry. It is
part of Smith’s account that ‘in order for one to have more justication for believing a
proposition P than a proposition Q, it is necessary that one’s evidence E normically support
P more strongly than Q’ (2010: 17). And plausibly Bruce’s evidence normically supports
the proposition that the computer background is blue more strongly than Martin’s does.
How might a defender of the risk-minimisation conception respond to this challenge?
Here I will have to content myself with outlining one strategy that I think is promising,
though the issue deserves a more extended treatment.18
The simplest proposal is just to bite the bullet, and insist that in the example described
Martin in fact has more justication than Bruce. Now, I do think that it should be con-
ceded that it is plausible that, in some sense, Martin is epistemically worse off with his
probabilistic evidence than Bruce is with his non-probabilistic evidence. But we can
explain this without conceding that Bruce has more justication than Martin. On the
account of knowledge I favour, knowing requires that one’s belief meet a safety condition;
very roughly, a belief is safe just in case in all the close worlds in which one forms that
belief, it is true.19 Bruce’s belief is safe, while Martin’s is not. In this sense I think
Smith is right that Bruce’s belief is a good candidate for knowledge while Martin’s is
not. But Martin’s epistemic situation being inferior in this respect is perfectly compatible
with it being superior in others, including those that determine degree of justication. The
resulting picture will seem rather strange from the perspective of one who thinks of belief
17 In a recent paper Declan Smithies (2012) argues that one isn’t justied in believing lottery propositions
and the like, but only that it is very likely that (say) one’s lottery ticket has lost. On Smithies’s view,
belief is distinguished from a very high degree of condence by one’s willingness to take P as settled,
and so to take P for granted in one’s practical reasoning. By these lights, it is plausible that one doesn’t
really believe that one’s ticket will lose after all, and so it is not a big concession to hold that such a
belief cannot be justied. But what Smithies treats as the crucial difference between believing P and
mere high condence that P can also be seen as the difference between believing P while believing
that one knows P and believing P while recognising (or at least suspecting) that one does not know
P, and Smithies offers no argument for preferring his view over this alternative. (It is no part of my
alternative proposal to deny that there is a difference between belief and mere high condence, of
course. It is only where and how to draw the line that is at issue.) Moreover, I worry that on
Smithies’s proposal we will count as believing very little, particularly about the future.
18 It is worth mentioning another strategy that has been defended recently, due to Comesaña (2009), who
responds to a similar case offered as an objection to reliabilism in Adler 2005. Those who nd the pro-
posal in the main text unsatisfactory may want to consider Comesaña’s proposal more carefully than I
have the space to do here.
19 Smith is also a proponent of a safety condition on knowledge (see in particular Smith 2009). Indeed,
Smith’s normic support condition on justication is modelled on Safety (Smith 2009: 176).
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as aiming at knowledge, and of degrees of justication as relating to how good one’s
attempt at hitting that target is. But that is precisely the perspective urged by Bird, and
above we found it lacking motivation.
It is worth considering a variant of the example also discussed by Smith (2010: 18–
19).20 Let us take things to be as in the earlier case, but this time let us suppose that
Bruce is hallucinating, and that despite the odds the computer background is red rather
than blue. Smith holds that this does nothing to shake our sense that Bruce has more
justication to believe that the screen is blue than Martin does – indeed, that Bruce
has justication while Martin does not (2010: 19). But obviously in this variant Bruce
is no more able to form a safe belief than Martin is, and so one cannot appeal to this
difference between them to explain any sense we have that, at least in some respect,
Bruce’s belief has more epistemically going for it than Martin’s. However, I no longer
nd myself particularly tempted to say there is any such respect. I agree that, given
the way the variant is described, Bruce remains justied in believing that the computer
background is blue. And I am willing (for present purposes at least) to grant that
Bruce has the same evidence in the variant as he had in the original example. But despite
this, I struggle to see any respect in which Bruce’s false belief has more going for it than
Martin’s false belief.
A second variant also appears to unsettle the strategy I have suggested.21 Suppose that
Martin believes that the computer background is blue on the basis of his knowledge that
this is overwhelmingly likely, given the setup of the computer. As in the variant discussed
in the previous paragraph, the computer background is in fact red. However, this time
Bruce’s perceptual faculties are working just ne, and on the basis of the computer back-
ground’s visual appearance, he comes to believe that it is red rather than blue. The risk-
minimisation conception seems to commit us to saying that Martin has more justication
for his false belief than Bruce has for his true one, and this might seem intolerable. In fact,
the only real difference between this variant and the original example described by Smith
is that, against the odds, Martin has a false belief. As a matter of psychology, knowing this
may make us more tempted to say that Martin cannot have more justication than Bruce.
But on the risk-minimisation conception, as on most accounts of justication, the truth-
value of Martin’s belief is irrelevant to how much justication he has. And so the clear-
headed defender of the risk-minimisation should insist that this second variant raises no
new issues. As in Smith’s original example, Martin has more justication than Bruce,
though Bruce’s belief has something epistemically going for it that Martin’s does not,
namely that it is safe.
I have stressed that how best to respond to these kinds of objections is a large and
complicated issue, one meriting further discussion. It may be that further investigation
will reveal that the risk-minimisation conception really does ounder on lottery
cases, or that one can tinker with it to get results that t better with those that
Smith thinks are correct. But for now the conclusion I want to draw is just that no
strong argument against the risk-minimisation conception of justication seems to be
in the ofng here.
20 Thanks to Martin Smith for pointing out that this variant might reveal a problem for my proposal.
21 Thanks to Filippo Ferrari.
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4. normical support, degrees of justification and gettier cases
In this section I will offer two objections to Smith’s normical support account. The rst
will be to the claim that normical support is sufcient for having justication, and the
second to the more important claim that it is necessary for having justication.
Smith (2010: 28, n. 6) notes that his account implies that if one has more justication
for P than for Q, then one has justication for P. If one has more justication for P than
for Q, then any world in which E is true and P false is less normal than the most normal
worlds in which E is true and Q false (2010: 17). But then, assuming that there are maxi-
mally normal worlds in which E is true, it follows that the most normal worlds in which E
is true are worlds in which P is true, which is just to say that E normically supports P.
Smith isn’t worried by this implication, since he suggests that certain other gradable
adjectives work the same way: for example, if S is wetter than T, then S is wet. And
just as it is weird to say ‘S is wetter than T, but S is not wet’, Smith thinks it sounds
odd to say ‘One has more justication for believing P than Q, but one does not have jus-
tication for P’.
But there’s a crucial ambiguity in ‘having justication’ that Smith doesn’t take into
account. It can mean that one has some justication (however slight). This isn’t the
interpretation that is relevant to Smith’s discussion, since as we noted earlier, he operates
with a minimal working conception according to which if one has justication then it is
‘epistemically or intellectually appropriate for one to believe or accept that P is true,
given the evidence at one’s disposal’ (2010: 12). But notice that the kinds of claims
Smith thinks are odd are only odd on the rst, irrelevant interpretation:
One has more justication for believing P than Q, but one has no/hasn’t any/hasn’t the slightest
justication for believing P.
If we disambiguate in favour of the second, relevant interpretation, the oddness
disappears:
Given the evidence at one’s disposal, it’s more epistemically or intellectually appropriate for one to
believe P than for one to believe Q, but it’s not epistemically or intellectually appropriate for one to
believe P.
So, contrary to Smith’s suggestion, it should be reckoned a cost of his account that it
entails the claim that, if one has more justication for P than for Q, then one has justica-
tion for P. For in the sense of ‘having justication’ relevant to Smith’s discussion, that
claim is genuinely counterintuitive.
We must note that Smith’s argument that his account has the consequence just dis-
cussed implicitly assumes that normical support is to be taken as a sufcient condition
for having justication; if it were not taken to be sufcient, all that we would be able
to conclude is that if one has more justication for P than for Q, then one’s evidence nor-
mically supports P. Now, Smith does argue for the sufciency claim towards the end of his
paper, on the grounds that doing so enables him to preserve a multi-premise closure prin-
ciple for justication (2010: 26–7). However, he also considers a hybrid account of having
justication for P, which in addition to E normically supporting P requires that P be suf-
ciently evidentially likely given E (2010: 26). It is clear that Smith intends his ofcial
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position to be consistent with either of these options, and so while this rst objection
suggests that Smith’s preferred version of the normical support account is more proble-
matic than he reckoned, the more interesting issue concerns the defensibility of the neces-
sity claim.22 I turn to that issue now.
Smith wants to embrace the conclusion that one cannot have justication for lottery
propositions and certain lottery-like propositions (e.g. that the computer screen in the
example above is displaying a blue background), but he wants to resist the conclusion
that subjects in standard Gettier cases lack justication (2010: 10–2).23 But this puts an
enormous strain on our grip of when normical support is present and when it is absent.
Consider again the case of Ashley, who forms the true belief that it is two o’clock by look-
ing at a generally reliable but stopped watch. Is there really any greater abnormality in a
reliable watch stopping than in one’s lottery ticket winning? Does the former cry out for
explanation in a way that the latter doesn’t? I nd it hard to see why it should; after all,
even very reliable watches will stop from time to time. Now, the one Gettier case Smith
explicitly discusses clearly does involve abnormality – one correctly believes that a wall
is red on the basis of its red appearance, but the wall is bathed in very strong red light
emanating from a cleverly hidden source (2010: 11). But the point here is just that it is
not at all obvious that this is a feature of standard Gettier cases in general, as Smith
needs it to be.24
How might we adjudicate this dispute over whether Smith’s normical support con-
dition is met in all standard Gettier cases? It is not really clear. In support of the claim
that normical support is absent in lottery cases, Smith (2010: 20. 21) cites Vogel’s plaus-
ible claim that while one’s ticket is very unlikely to win, there’s an ‘intuitive sense’ in which
there would be no abnormality in that happening (1990: 16). That strikes me as fair
enough, but the worry is that there seems equally to be an intuitive sense in which there’s
nothing abnormal about a very reliable watch stopping.
Smith also offers a more theoretical reason to think that lottery and lottery-like cases
differ from standard Gettier cases in the way he suggests. He writes (2010: 17):
If one believes that a proposition P is true, based upon evidence that normically supports it then,
while one’s belief is not assured to be true, this much is assured: If one’s belief turns out to be false,
then the error has to be attributable to mitigating circumstances – the error can be explained
in terms of disobliging environmental conditions, or cognitive or perceptual malfunction or
some such.
22 However, notice that the hybrid account that this rst objection pushes Smith to is no better placed to
respond to challenges to closure principles resting on considerations about risk-aggregation than the
risk-minimisation conception is, since these challenges turn only on the claim that high evidential like-
lihood is necessary for justication. This substantiates my earlier claim (n. 14) that such challenges do
not provide Smith with any ammunition against the risk-minimisation conception.
23 I make the contrast with standard Gettier cases since although I think that lottery cases are Gettier
cases at some level of abstraction – they are cases of justied true belief that fail to be cases of knowl-
edge – I also think that there are signicant differences between lottery cases and standard Gettier
cases; only in the latter is it a matter of luck that one’s belief is true. See McGlynn 2011: §1 for details
and defence.
24 I think a parallel point could be argued concerning the lottery variants discussed in Vogel 1990 and
Hawthorne 2004. Smith anticipates this worry, and argues that these lottery variants are actually
unlike lottery cases and cases such as Smith’s belief that the computer background is blue (2010:
21–2). I don’t nd Smith’s response entirely satisfactory, but I won’t push this point further here.
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Like Bird, Smith takes one signicant difference between lottery (and lottery-like) cases
and standard Gettier cases to be that only in the latter can an error be chalked up to miti-
gating circumstances of this sort. This seems plausible enough. But the desired conclusion,
that there is normical support present in standard Gettier cases, doesn’t follow from any of
this. For this to follow, we’d need the converse of the claim Smith makes in the passage
just quoted; that whenever error is attributable to mitigating circumstances, then one’s
belief must be based on evidence that normically supports the proposition in question.
However, the latter is precisely the claim called into question by cases like that of
Ashley. Were Ashley’s belief that it’s two o’clock to prove wrong, that would indeed be
attributable to mitigating external circumstances: specically, to her watch having
stopped. But the worry remains that it is just not clear what sense of ‘normal’ licenses
the claim that worlds in which Ashley’s watch reads two o’clock but in which it is not
two o’clock cannot be just as normal as worlds in which one’s lottery ticket is almost cer-
tain to lose and yet wins. And so I remain unconvinced that normical support is a plaus-
ible necessary condition on having justication.
I don’t pretend that either of these worries offers a decisive objection to Smith’s
account. As we have seen, my rst objection only targets the claim that normical support
is sufcient for having justication, a claim that isn’t an essential component of Smith’s
position. And perhaps some method for deciding when normical support is present and
when it is absent will bear the weight Smith’s contrasting treatment of lottery cases and
standard Gettier cases places on this distinction. As things stand, however, Smith’s
account strikes me as rather problematic.
conclusion
Three limitations of my discussion are worth reiterating. First, I have not tried to pretend
that the risk-minimisation conception is problem free. There is a knot of issues concerning
lotteries and closure principles that the risk-minimisation conception seems to feed, and
while I have argued that abandoning the conception in the face of these issues is an over-
reaction, they clearly deserve careful further consideration. Second, I have done little or
nothing here to defend internalism about justication. Now, part of the reason I take
the task of engaging with such knowledge rst accounts of justication to be of signi-
cance is its bearing on the kind of resolution – or perhaps better, dissolution – of the
internalism–externalism debate discussed in the introduction. But none of the arguments
in this paper have turned on intuitions or principles that are in any way the exclusive prop-
erty of internalists, and the risk-minimisation conception I have defended is neutral on this
issue. Third, as I stressed in the introduction, nothing I have said here constitutes any kind
of argument against Williamson’s knowledge rst account of justication; indeed, it is
naturally interpreted as an externalist version of the risk-minimisation conception, accord-
ing to which one has justication for P just in case P is sufciently likely in light of what
one knows.
What I have done here is challenge several important senses in which justication might
be thought to be a subsidiary of knowledge. First, I have argued against two attempts to
esh out the thought that justication is ‘would-be’ knowledge, and I have tried to defend
a more traditional conception of justication, according to which having justication for P
is a matter of P being sufciently likely given one’s total evidence. Second, I have resisted
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the claim that one cannot have justication for lottery propositions and other propositions
that one recognises one cannot know on the basis of the evidence at one’s disposal –
‘known unknowns’, in Sutton’s (2007) terminology – and the associated claim that belief
aims at knowledge. So while my discussion of Bird and Smith falls far short of putting us
in a position to dismiss the idea that justication should be understood in terms of knowl-
edge once and for all, I hope that it will nonetheless provide encouragement to those who
continue to hold that justication possesses a signicant degree of autonomy from
knowledge.
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